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Résumé / Abstract 
 
La théorie des jeux prédit que la résolution des jeux de négociation séquentielle  dépend 
essentiellement de l’évolution de la rente à partager dans le temps (taux d’escompte), et du 
pouvoir d’ultimatum de l’offreur à la première période. Nous étudions à l’aide de la méthode 
expérimentale huit jeux de négociation séquentielle afin d’évaluer l’impact du pouvoir de 
négociation et du taux d’escompte sur les comportements. Chaque jeu est répété une fois avant 
de passer à un nouveau jeu, notre test est composé de cycle composé de 16 jeux consécutifs. Les 
participants ont été confrontés à 3 cycles. Au cours du test, aucun effet d’expérience lié à la 
répétition des jeux n’a été détecté. Les participants ont adopté un comportement stable et robuste 
d’anticipation des changements de règle de jeu. Les stratégies mises en œuvre font référence à 
des considérations, non stratégiques, basées à la fois sur des normes sociales d’équité et 
d’efficience. 
 
The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how "the pie'' 
changes over time, and whether the proposer in an early round has ultimatum power. We 
experimentally study eight such games. Each game is once repeated before being followed by the 
next one, which defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants play three such 
cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong and reliable effects of anticipated rule 
changes. The latter, however, are not due to strategic considerations but rather to the social 
norms of fairness and efficiency. 
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1. Introduction
Alternating oﬀer bargaining is a familiar topic in experimental economics. Starting with
Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1985) the late eighties experienced a vivid debate whether
and how actual bargaining behavior diﬀers from game theoretic predictions (see Güth,
1995, and Roth, 1995, for surveys). Almost invariably these studies assume a “shrinking
pie”, namely. that delaying an agreement is costly, for instance due to discounting.
Why does one insist on alternations in proposing? The usual argument is that this
is what one observes in reality. Unfortunately, the solution behavior of such bargaining
games predicts an immediate agreement, that is it denies that alternating proposals will
be observed. One way out of this dilemma is to rely on incomplete information (e.g.
Harsanyi and Selten, 1972, or Rubinstein, 1985). Another possibility is to allow also for
increasing pies as in our study.
What was varied more systematically before was the time horizon T , that is the
last period for reaching an agreement, varying from T = 1 (Güth et al., 1982), T = 2
(Binmore et al., 1985, Güth and Tietz, 1986, Ochs and Roth, 1989), T = 3 (Ochs and
Roth, 1989), T = 5 (Neelin et al., 1988) to “T =∞”, i.e. to not specifying explicitly a
final period T (Weg, Rapoport, and Felsenthal, 1990) as suggested by Rubinstein (1982).
One major result of these studies is that only for T = 1 and T = 2 the implications of
backward induction are obvious even when this does not always imply the corresponding
behavior. For T > 3, strategic considerations are more of the forward induction type1.
Since the influence of the time horizon T has already been thoroughly explored, our
experiment always relies on T = 3.
1Unlike in game theory where forward induction is used to select among subgame perfect equilibria,
e.g. the stability concept of Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, we use it in a much broader sense, namely as
a reasoning idea used to generate a likely or intended play of the game. In alternating oﬀer bargaining
for a shrinking pie, one such an idea is, e.g. to demand the diﬀerence between the 1st and 2nd round
pie in round 1 if this yields more than 50 % of the 1st round pie.
The fact that parties alternate in proposing an agreement does not necessarily imply
that bargaining has to end in the last period T if no earlier agreement is reached. If
there is commitment power at all (which is implicitly assumed by all bargaining models),
it seems feasible that one can always declare one’s oﬀer to be final, that is one has
ultimatum power (Güth, Ockenfels, and Wendel, 1993). In our experiment participants
confront both situations, namely on where each proposer has ultimatum power and one
where bargaining may be stopped early only by an early agreement.
Over time the “pie”, that is what can be distributed among the parties, can either
decrease or increase. Whereas a shrinking pie reflects the well-known costs of delaying
an agreement, such as wasting time, starting too late to cooperate etc., an increasing pie
can be justified by the fact that later agreements are often more adequate, for example
by being based on more information, superior incentives etc. Here we do not only rely
on monotonic developments but also explore a “hill” (the “pie” is largest in period 2)
and a “valley” (the “pie” is lowest in period 2). A vector (p1, p2, p3) of pies pt in periods
t = 1, 2, 3 is numerically specified for each of the four (the two monotonic and the two
non-monotonic) diﬀerent “pie”-developments.
What motivates studying non-monotonic pie-developments in the form of ”hills” and
”valleys”? Clearly, there can be situations when there is just one point in time for
striking a deal, for instance when opportunity costs of the deal are exceptionally high.
Our main motivation, however, has been a theoretical one: In case of a ”valley” one
may want to strike the deal either in the first or in the last round. Participants who
failed in reaching an early agreement may thus want to signal their intentions for a
late agreement by their choices in the intermediate round. A ”hill”, on the other hand,
suggests avoiding an early as well as a late agreement. Thus, the first round can be used
for signaling one’s intentions whereas the last rounds oﬀers the opportunity to punish
the other participant when failing to reach an intermediate agreement.
Each of the four vectors (p1, p2, p3) is first played twice with and then twice without
ultimatum power. Thus, participants first learn to play a usual alternating oﬀer game
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before commanding ultimatum power already in the earlier periods (t = 1 and t = 2).
We refer to the altogether 16 games (4 vectors (p1, p2, p3)×4 successive plays) as a cycle.
Participants play three such cycles, that is altogether 48 bargaining games.
How behavior is influenced by past results is intensively studied, both theoretically (in
evolutionary game theory and economics) and experimentally (see Roth and Erev,1995,
for a selective overview). By letting participants play the same simple or more complex
(e.g. Huck, Normann, and Oechsler, 1999) game many times, one observes how behavior
adapts to previous experiences in an otherwise constant environment. Here we also study
such “behavioral adaptation” but restrict experiences with the same game to 6 plays and
with the same vector (p1, p2, p3) to 12 plays.
Contrary to many theoretical models of behavioral adaptation (see Weibull, 1995,
for a survey), boundedly rational decision making is influenced by past experiences
(the shadow of the past) and by deliberating the likely consequences of the various
choice alternatives (the shadow of the future). Especially boundedly rational decision
makers should deliberately react to a changing environment, by switching from one
of the eight games to another. “Robust learning experiments” (see Güth, 2000, for a
comparison with other studies) do not study behavior in one game but in a variety of
related games. The idea is to collect evidence for learning (in the sense of improving
behavioral parameters in the light of past experiences) and for cognitive adjustments
when confronting a new situation. In the light of such evidence one can hopefully model
how learning and forward looking deliberation interact in a process of boundedly rational
decision emergence. Unlike perfect rationality, bounded rationality should be based on
sound empirical facts rather than abstract axioms. The former can be provided by
explorative and hypotheses testing (robust learning) experiments.
With this background in mind, we can summarize the main intentions of our exper-
imental study:
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• We want to establish (stylized) facts and a data basis illustrating how boundedly
rational negotiators learn from previous experiences with the same or a closely
related bargaining game.
• We want to demonstrate that the likely consequences of bargaining behavior are
anticipated, but not in a perfectly rational way, as suggested by backward induc-
tion, but rather in a norm-guided way. More specifically, we want to show that
strategic aspects which are crucial for the game theoretic solutions do not matter
much behaviorally. Thus, orthodox game theory has to be complemented by a
behavioral theory of (here bargaining) game playing.
• If the largest “pie” requires delaying an agreement, eﬃciency (in the sense of
reaching an agreement when the pie is largest) requires a lot of trust that one will
not be exploited. Our experimental data should reveal whether the fear of being
exploited questions eﬃciency and whether such a fear is justified.
Our results are straightforward: Participants mostly reach an agreement when the
pie is largest and they share this pie rather equally (slightly favoring the proposer in
this period). Especially in case of universal ultimatum power this often contradicts game
theory. Partly unfair oﬀers are used to discourage ineﬃcient agreements. Regarding the
first two aspects, this shows that learning is of no or little importance and that, in simple
environments like ours, norm-guided deliberation is crucial.
In the section 2 below we introduce the eight games and their benchmark solutions.
Section 3 is devoted to details of the experimental procedure. Section 4 describes the
main results, and section 5 statistically corroborates them. Section 6 concludes.
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2. The game variety
Two bargaining parties, players 1 and 2, alternate in proposing an agreement which the
other can then accept or reject. Acceptance ends the game with the proposed payoﬀ
distribution, a vector (u1, u2) with pt ≥ u1, u2 ≥ 0 and u1 + u2 = pt where the pie pt
is what can be distributed in period t = 1, 2, 3. If t < T and the oﬀer pt − dt to the
other party (dt is what the proposer demands for him- or herself) is not an ultimatum,
rejection leads to period t + 1 where pt+1 can now be allocated by the rejecting party.
If t = T or if, for t < T , the oﬀer pt − dt is an ultimatum, rejection implies conflict
with each party that receives 0-payoﬀ. Acceptance, of course, implies that the proposer
receives dt and the responder pt − dt. In period
t = 1: player 1 chooses d1, i.e. 1 proposes, 2 responds,
t = 2: player 2 chooses d2, i.e. 2 proposes, 1 responds,
t = 3: player 1 chooses d3, i.e. 1 proposes, 2 responds.
If one disregards diﬀerent individual time preferences, as for instance studied by
Ochs and Roth (1989), the “pie”-development for T = 3 can be described by the vector
(p1, p2, p3) of “pies” pt specifying in German Marks (DM) what can be distributed in
period t = 1, 2, 3. We rely on the four vectors (p1, p2, p3) listed in Table II.1.
p1 p2 p3 nickname symbol
30 20 10 decline D
10 20 30 increase I
10 25 10 hill H
25 10 25 valley V
Table II.1: The four “pie”-developments
Each of the four vectors D, I, H and V can be played with proposers having ulti-
matum power, the games Dy, Iy, Hy, and V y, or not, the games Dn, In, Hn, and V n.
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For each of the four vectors D, I, H, and V (the four rows in Table II.2) the left col-
umn of Table II.2 describes the (subgame perfect equilibrium, see Selten, 1975) solution
demands (d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3) and their payoﬀ implications u
∗
1 and u
∗
2 for players 1 and 2 when
only integer oﬀers are possible and an indiﬀerent responder always rejects. If ultimatum
power is available, it will always be used, i.e. each proposal d∗t for t = 1, 2, 3 and the
games Dy, Iy, Hy, and V y is an ultimatum. Thus with ultimatum power bargaining
always stops in period t = 1 whereas this is true only for D if no ultimatum power is
available. The period t∗ in which the agreement is reached2 is indicated in Table II.2
by fat demands d∗t . Whereas in the n-games D
n, In, Hn, and V n the outcome is always
eﬃcient in the sense that u∗1 and u
∗
2 add up to the maximal “pie”, this is only true for
the y-games Dy and V y when p1 is largest.
ultimatum power
(p1, p2, p3)-type n(o) y(es)
d∗1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3 u
∗
1 u
∗
2 d
∗
1 d
∗
2 d
∗
3 u
∗
1 u
∗
2
D = (30, 20, 10) 19 10 9 19 11 29 19 9 29 1
I = (10, 20, 30) 10 20 29 29 1 9 19 29 9 1
H = (10, 25, 10) 10 15 9 10 15 9 24 9 9 1
V = (25, 10, 25) 24 10 24 24 1 24 9 24 24 1
Table II.2: The solution demands d∗1, d
∗
2, d
∗
3 and payoﬀs u
∗
1, u
∗
2 for the eight diﬀerent
games Dy, Iy, Hy, V y and, respectively, Dn, In, Hn, V n
3. Experimental procedure
The computerized experiment involved 6 sessions, 5 with 12 participants and 1 with
10. Participants, mostly students of economics or business administration of Humboldt
University, Berlin, were invited by leaflets to register for the experiment. They were
2The agreement period t∗ for game V n , where player 1 can achieve the same agreement in periods
1 and 3, is left ambiguous in spite of our requirements (according to our assumptions player 2 should
reject the first oﬀer and accept the second in period t = 3 where acceptance is the only best reply).
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seated at visually isolated terminals where they found the written instructions (see
Appendix A for an English translation). After reading them carefully participants could
privately ask for clarifications. Then the experiment started with the first cycle.
A cycle consisted of two plays of Dn , followed by two plays of Dy, and continuing
with this pattern for the vector I,H, and V with four plays each. This cycle of altogether
16 rounds was twice repeated. After each round participants were randomly rematched
without switching roles (of players 1 and 2, respectively). Thus, a participant usually
confronted six diﬀerent partners in an irregular fashion. Average earnings were DM
32.9 including the DM 5.0 show-up fee. A session took about 110 minutes (30 minutes
for reading the instructions and answering questions). More detailed information about
monetary payoﬀs is contained in Table IV.1 where earnings are separated according to
role (players 1 and 2), game type, and cycle.
4. Results
A coarse way of searching for experience eﬀects is to compare the average relative (to
the maximal pie) earnings of both players for the three cycles (see Table IV.1 which
distinguishes by roles, 1 or 2, cycle (1st, 2nd, 3rd), pie-vector (D, I,H, V, all) and n(o) or
y(es) ultimatum power). Relative earnings are surprisingly constant over the three cycles
when proposers command no ultimatum power. We only found significant diﬀerences
in the y−games’ relative earnings between cycles.3 When comparing relative earning
variations in and between cycles, we found significant increases only for the Decline
pie-development with ultimatum power (between the 1st cycle (rounds 3 and 4) and the
3rd cycle (rounds 35 and 36) and between these two cycles p = .0008, Binomial test,
one-tailed, for all tests).
3Statistically one compares for i = 1, 2 the diﬀerences in average relative (to the maximal pie)
earnings between cycles separately for each of the four games (with ultimatum power) with individual
plays as observations. These test results are, of course, questionable since they assume independence in
spite of repeated interaction. In our view, such test results are nevertheless informative. We will partly
test treatment eﬀects more convincingly by using matching group averages as independent observations.
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For the n−games the distribution of relative earnings in the 3rd cycle is not sig-
nificantly diﬀerent from those in cycles 1 and 2 with p = .479 for player 1 (Wilcoxon
Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test, one-tailed) and, respectively p = .479 for player 2.
For the y−games one obtains significant diﬀerences with p = .0001 and p = .0001 for
players 1 and. 2, respectively. This suggests
Role 1 Role 2 Both Roles
Cycles 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Decline n .47 .44 .49 .43 .40 .45 .45 .42 .47
y .41 .49 .49 .35 .41 .42 .38 .45 .45
Increase n .45 .49 .49 .41 .43 .43 .43 .46 .46
y .33 .45 .43 .29 .38 .37 .31 .41 .40
Hill n .42 .41 .41 .50 .49 .50 .46 .45 .46
y .34 .35 .36 .41 .47 .46 .38 .41 .41
Valley n .47 .48 .48 .40 .40 .41 .44 .44 .44
y .42 .40 .48 .34 .33 .39 .38 .36 .44
All games n .45 .45 .47 .43 .43 .45 .44 .44 .46
y .38 .42 .44 .35 .40 .41 .36 .41 .43
Table IV.1: Average earnings as shares of max{p1,p2,p3} separated by game type, role,
and cycle (including conflicts)
Observation 1: Unlike in games without early veto power where eﬃcient conflict set-
tlements dominate right from the start participants in games with early veto power
achieve such agreements only when becoming more experienced. Average earnings
are aﬀected by the conflict rate, the period of reaching an agreement, and the
payoﬀ distribution which is accepted.
The first aspect is illuminated in Table IV.2 listing the agreement and, respectively,
conflict ratios as well as their absolute numbers (for the three cycles) separately for the
n(o) and the y(es)−games and the periods t = 1, 2, 3. Most agreements occurred when
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the periodic pie is largest (in case of ”V (alley)” this applies to the 1st and 3rd periods).
Remember that game theory excludes conflict and predicts agreement for games with
the largest periodic pie except for the games Iy and Hy (see Table II.2). The agreement
ratios in Table IV.2 thus imply
Observation 2: Agreement is mostly achieved when the pie is largest, which partly
(for games Iy and Hy) rejects game theory.4
ultimatum power
N(o) Y (es)
agreement agreement conflict
1 2 3 (agree/con f ) 1 2 3 1 2 3
D .80 .63 .44 .56 .82 .91 - .13 .09 -
(54 ,53,60) (11 ,8,8) (4,2,1) (1 ,7 ,1 ) (48,61 ,63) (7 ,2 ,1 ) (0 ,0 ,0) (15,6,6) (0,1 ,0) (0 ,0 ,0)
I 03 .06 .93 .07 .05 .08 .92 .01 .12 .08
(4 ,1 ,1 ) (7,4,1) (54,61 ,63) (5 ,4 ,5) (5,6,0) (6 ,3 ,6) (38 ,54,52) (3 ,0 ,0) (10 ,5 ,9) (8 ,2 ,3)
H .04 .91 .56 .44 .06 .84 .50 .01 .15 .50
(2 ,2 ,4) (62 ,61 ,61 ) (4,3,3) (2 ,4 ,2) (6,4,2) (50,56 ,57) (1 ,0 ,0) (1 ,1 ,1 ) (12 ,9 ,9) (0 ,0 ,1 )
V .50 .00 .75 .25 .68 .00 .65 .22 .09 .35
(38 ,34,32) (0,0,0) (23,27,30) (9 ,9 ,8) (49,45 ,49) (0 ,0 ,0) (4 ,6 ,12) (11 ,15,7) (1 , 2 ,0) (5 ,2 ,2)
Table IV.2: Conditional probability of reaching an agreement or of conflict (only for
ultimatum power) in period t (total number of 1rst, 2nd, 3rd cycle in brackets).
There are, however, non-negligible numbers of conflicts, namely, 28 for Dy, 40 for Iy,
34 forHy, and 45 for V y when proposers have ultimatum power (for no ultimatum power
the frequencies of conflict are 9 for Dn, 14 for In, 6 for Hn and 26 for V n). Conflict
frequency often, but not always, decreases with experience, as measured by cycle (see
conflict frequencies in brackets, Table IV.2). Unlike the n−games, conflicts in y−games
can result earlier or later: like agreements they result more frequently in period t when pt
4What is actually rejected is commonly known rationality with respect to one’s own material success.
Allowing for idiosyncratic preferences (how can those be commonly known?) risks rendering rationality
as tautological.
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is largest, that is when one would have expected a fair oﬀer. More specifically, comparing
the conflict ratios in games Dy and V y (where p1 is largest) with those in games Iy and
Hy yields significant diﬀerences (p = .047 Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Test,
one-tailed, for Dy versus Iy and p = .023 for V y versus Hy).5
Observation 3: Conflict occurs most frequently in the 1st period of games with ultima-
tum power only for game types Dy and V y when the 1st pie is largest (for the other
y−games conflict is delayed). Without ultimatum power the pie-development V
inspires the most conflicts (in all three cycles).
Since eﬃciency of agreements depends only weakly on the level of experience (as
measured by cycle), Table IV.3 provides a fair overview of the eﬃciency rate
δ =
u1 + u2
max{p1, p2, p3}
of agreements for all eight game types (cases of conflict are excluded). Ultimatum power
of proposers hardly aﬀects eﬃciency of agreements even in games Iy and Hy where the
game theoretic benchmark solution predicts δ = 1
3
and, respectively, δ = 2
5
. Also, the
diﬀerences between pie-dynamics are minor (≤ .07).
Usually. the agreed upon distributions slightly favor the player who is the proposer
for the largest pie, as revealed by player 1’s payoﬀ shares
s =
u1
u1 + u2
of agreements listed in Table IV.3. Only the pie-dynamics “H(ill)” with player 2 as the
proposer when the pie is largest yields a share s < .5. If one compares the s−share in
games Hn and Hy with that of the other games, the (negative) diﬀerence is highly sig-
nificant; similar comparisons between the other games reveal no significant eﬀects. This
is qualitatively in line with the benchmark solution for Hn (with s∗ = .4). Altogether,
the results in Table IV.3 suggest
5We only compare those two games whose maximal pie-values are the same.
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Observation 4: Agreements are nearly always eﬃcient, i.e., reached in period t when
pt is largest, and slightly favor (by a not more than 5% deviation from the equal
split) the proposer in that period t.
N(o) Y (es)
(δ, s) (δ, s)
D (.93,.52) (.98,.54)
I (.96,.53) (.93,.54)
H (.95,.46) (.96,.45)
V (1,.54) (1,.55)
Table IV.3 : Eﬃciency and relative payoﬀ distributions δ and s when conflict is
avoided.
ultimatum power
(p1, p2, p3)-type n(o) y(es)
d1 d2 d3 u1 u2 d1 d2 d3 u1 u2
D = (30, 20, 10) 16.5 11.2 6.7 14 12.8 16.9 9.5 13.8 11.7
I = (10, 20, 30) 8 13.2 16.2 14.3 12.6 8 12.9 16.2 12 10.5
H = (10, 25, 10) 7.3 13.8 5.9 10.3 12.4 7.3 14.4 7 8.8 11.2
V = (25, 10, 25) 14.3 7.0 14 11.9 10 14.1 6.8 13.9 10.8 8.8
Table IV.4: The average demands and payoﬀs observed for the eight games Dy, Iy, Hy,
V y and, respectively, Dn, In, Hn, V n (fat entries when pt is largest)
Table IV.4 corresponds to Table II.2 and documents that participants are much fairer
than the theory predicts. More specifically, in our data file extreme allocations with u∗2 =
1 are completely avoided. For the n−games the actual results are at least qualitatively
in line with the eﬀects, as suggested by the benchmark solution.6 In y−games where
the benchmark solution always predicts meager oﬀers (pt− dt = 1) it cannot account at
all for the actual behavior. Minor diﬀerences are due to the diﬀerences in conflict ratios
and in degrees of missing an agreement when the pie is largest.
6That most agreements for V n are reached in period t = 1 only questions the special assumption for
the case of indiﬀerence.
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According to Table IV.4 the average oﬀers in the direction of the period with the
maximal pie can be quite meager: thus the average demands d1 in period 1 for the vector
I are at 80% of p1 are rather unfair; for period 2 at 66% for In and 64.5% for Iy, they
are still above the level of 54% in period 3 when the pie is maximal. Also for the vector
H the average demand in period 1 at 73% is much higher than the average demanded
share of 55.2% (for Hn) and, respectively 57.6% (for Hy) in period 2 with the largest
pie. The average demanded shares d2 for the vector V are slightly more moderate (70
% for V n, 68% for V y). Also, after missing an agreement for the largest pie (in periods
t = 2 and 3 for D and in period t = 3 for H) the oﬀers are quite generous.
Observation 5: The desire to reach an agreement when the pie is largest is signaled
and, respectively, induced by meager oﬀers in earlier periods, both in n−games and
in y−games (in the latter an additional signal is, of course, not to use ultimatum
power).
The last observation is corroborated by Figure IV.1 which plots the relative oﬀers at
periods t = 1, 2, 3. The bold line links the relative oﬀers made when the pie is largest
(here, unlike in Table IV.3, the rejected oﬀers are included). For the largest pie-periods
mean relative oﬀers stay within the narrow interval [.38; .47], whereas the mean relative
oﬀers for given rounds t fluctuate a lot. Participants who fail to reach an agreement at
the highest pie- period (D and H games) often propose higher relative counter oﬀers in
the next period (in 31.25% of cases).
12
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Figure IV.1: Average relative oﬀers at period t = 1, 2, 3 and t = max{p1, p2, p3} over
rounds
The ways in which an agreement can be reached when pt is largest diﬀer for n−
and y−games. In an n−game the proposer in that period t < 3 must suggest (to
the responder in t) an acceptable distribution of pt. In a y−game the proposer can
additionally exclude any further possibility to reach an agreement by declaring the oﬀer
to be final. Do proposers in y−games rely on the same mechanism as in n−games?
Table IV.5 displays the rates (and the absolute numbers) of exercising one’s ultimatum
power separately for t = 1 and t = 2 (in t = 3 every oﬀer is an ultimatum oﬀer), the four
pie-developments, and each cycle. Around 70% of the oﬀers pt−dt when pt is largest are
ultimatum oﬀers. Thus, ultimatum power is not just neglected but consistently used:
Observation 6: Contrary to game theory, ultimatum power is not always exercised,
but mainly used to encourage acceptance when pt is largest.
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Altogether, our data suggest that commitment power, here in the sense of ultimatum
power, is largely overrated in game theory. At least the desire to strive for fair and
eﬃcient agreements seems to be much more influential than assumed. This conclusion
is supported by Table IV.4 listing average payoﬀs (which never diﬀer by more than 2.5,
i.e. |u1 − u2| < 2.5).
Mean Frequency of ultimatums
cycle t = 1 t = 2 t = 1 t = 2
1 .70 .33 98 14
D 2 .73 .16 102 6
3 .67 .04 94 2
All .70 .17 294 22
1 .06 .23 8 30
I 2 .00 .11 0 16
3 .00 .17 0 24
All .02 .17 8 70
1 .01 .62 2 86
H 2 .01 .71 2 98
3 .03 .74 4 100
All .02 .69 8 284
1 .59 .03 82 2
V 2 .60 .07 84 4
3 .50 .00 70 0
All .56 .03 236 6
1 .34 .36 190 132
All 2 .34 .33 188 124
3 .30 .32 168 126
Table IV.5 : Termination options (rates and frequencies) chosen at periods t = 1, 2.
Let S denote the share of pt which has been oﬀered. In general, a low share S should
go along with a high rejection rate. Oﬀering a low share S must, however, must not
necessarily mean an attempt to exploit the responder. If pt is not the largest pie, it may
simply be a signal to wait for the larger pie. In Figure IV.6 a and b we illustrate for n−
and y−games as well as for the largest and non-largest pies the frequencies of rejected
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oﬀers for diﬀerent intervals for S, namely 0 ≤ S ≤ .17, .17 < S ≤ .33, .33 < S < .5, .5 ≤
S ≤ .5, .5 < S. Clearly, the usual relation between the fairness and acceptability of S
holds only for the largest pie-periods.
Observation 7: Only in the largest pie-period does the rejection rate decrease with the
relative share S which has been oﬀered
Frequencies of rejection in n-games
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
[0-.17[ [.17-.33[ [.33-.5[ [.5]
largest pie non largest pie
Figure IV.6 a
Frequencies  of rejection in y- games
0 ,0
0 ,2
0 ,4
0 ,6
0 ,8
1 ,0
largest  p ie non largest  p ie
Figure IV.6 b
5. Further statistical analysis
To illustrate how the previous observations are supported by our data, we have run a
linear regression explaining the oﬀer behavior. The oﬀer made to subject i at period t
with i = 1, ..., 70 and t = 1, 2, 3 is estimated by the following equation7:
Oit = γ0 + (γ1 + γ
0
1.T
Max
it )P
Max
it + γ2Pit.T
noMax
it + γ3T
erm
it + (γ4 + γ
0
4.T
Max
it )Ri,t + γ5A
fter
it
The variable PMaxit is the largest pie, i.e. P
Max
it = max{p1it , p2it , p3it}. TMaxit (T noMaxit )
represents a dummy variable taking value 1(0) if Pit, the pie for which subject i makes
7As participants alternate their position of proposer and responder during the round, oﬀer Oit is
made by participants in role 1 at periods t = 1 and t = 3, and by participants in role 2 for t = 2.
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an oﬀer at period t, is (not) largest and 0(1) otherwise. T ermi,t is also a dummy variable
with T ermit = 1 for y−games and T ermit = 0 for n−games. Variable Ri,t indicates the
round corresponding to observation Oit. A
fter
it is a dummy variable with value 1 when
period t follows the largest pie-period and 0 otherwise. In case of the pie−development
D one would have Afterit = 1 for t = 2 and in case of H, for t = 3.
To test the significance of Observation 5 that eﬃcient agreements are induced by
meager oﬀers in early periods parameter γ1, estimating the influence of P
Max
it , should be
significantly negative and parameter γ01, concerning the combined eﬀect of P
Max
it , signif-
icantly positive. Since Observation 6 claims that the termination option is not used to
exploit but rather to reach an eﬃcient agreement, the influence of the termination option
on oﬀers should be negative but insignificant. Furthermore, this should not significantly
increase the number of conflicts. To trace learning eﬀects we analyze separately the
influence of time Rit on oﬀers when the pie is largest (γ04T
Max
it Rit) and when it is not
(γ4Rit). The low level of learning in average relative earnings (Observation 1 ) does not
exclude learning eﬀects on oﬀer behavior.8
The regression result is listed in Table V.1. Overall, our model is highly significant
(p < .00001 and R2 = .7900) The expected eﬀects in line with Observation 5 are
significantly confirmed: PMaxi,t has a negative and highly significant overall eﬀect on oﬀer
behavior (γ1 < 0) in the non-maximal pie-periods and significantly increases oﬀers in
the maximal pie-period (γ01 > 0).
Observation 6 is weakly in line with the regression results since ultimatum power
implies only insignificantly smaller oﬀers in y−games (γ3 < 0). Oﬀers increase sig-
nificantly over time (γ4 > 0) and decrease only insignificantly when t is the largest
pie-period (γ04 > 0). The latter result is in line with Observation 6. In case of A
fter
it = 1
participants, who rejected in the largest pie-period, make a counter oﬀer. Their reactions
are captured by parameter γ5 which is positive and significant. Such counter oﬀers are
relatively higher to avoid delaying the agreement even more or not reaching one at all.
8Participants might have learned to increase their oﬀers and to avoid conflict more often so that on
the aggregate level earnings remain stable on average.
16
Variables B. t− statistic p− value
Constant γ0 −1.081 −2.142 .0322
PMaxi,t γ1 −.0611 −3.004 .0027
PMaxi,t .T
Max
i,t γ
0
1 .5400 57.651 .0001
Pi,t.T
noMax
i,t γ2 .4878 32.506 .0001
T ermi,t γ3 −.0906 −1.110 .2670
Ri,t γ4 .0114 2.603 .0093
Ri,t.T
Max
i,t γ
0
4 −.0059 −1.03 .2990
Afterit γ5 1.841 7.231 .0001
N = 3193(9) p− value = .00001
F (7, 3185) = 1711.75 R2 = .7900
Adjusted R2 = .78955
Table V.1: Estimation results of the regression
Acceptance behavior can be similarly explained by a probit regression in which the
dependent variable yit is coded into {0, 1} to estimate the probability of acceptance
(yit = 1) by subject i in period t with t = 1, 2, 3 and i = 1, .., 35 (a rejection is coded as
yit = 0). We denote by Oit the oﬀer to which yit reacts.
yit = α0+(α1+α
0
1.T
Max
it ).P
Max
it +(α2+α
0
2.T
Max
it ).Oi,t+α3T
erm
it +(α4+α
0
4.T
Max
it )Ri,t+α5A
fter
it
The estimation results, as reported in Table V. 2, show that the overall model is signifi-
cant. The probability of acceptance increases significantly with the oﬀer made (α2 > 0)
and even more if this is the largest pie period (α02 > 0). The highly significant and neg-
ative parameter α01 reveals that the overall probability of conflict is larger in the largest
pie-period: Participants are not simply eﬃciency minded (see the non-negligible numbers
of conflict in Table IV.2) and are more likely to reject in the largest pie-period. Accord-
ing to the positive and significant parameter α5 they later on are more inclined to accept
later on. Ultimatum power helps to reach an agreement (α3 > 0, p− level = .0001), con-
firming Observation 6 . Over time, the probability of acceptance decreases significantly,
that is responders learn to reject.
9Our regression takes 3193 observations into account instead of the 5040 theoretical ones due to
agreements in earlier periods (for t < 2 and t < 3).
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B S.E. t− ratio p− value
Constant α0 −1.5740 .431 −3.649 .0003
PMaxit α1 −.0230 .015 −1.425 .1542
PMaxit .T
Max
it α
0
1 −.1214 .014 −8.627 .0001
Oit α2 .1361 .018 7.481 .0001
Oit.T
Max
it α
0
2 .4082 .036 11.202 .0001
T ermi,t α3 .2745 .067 4.058 .0001
Rit α4 −.0133 .004 −3.057 .0022
Rit.T
Max
it α
0
4 .0094 .005 1.859 .0630
Afterit α5 1.792 .160 11.178 .0001
LogL = −922.2676 p− level = .0001
χ2 = 2563.695 N (10) = 3193
Table V.2: Estimation results of Probit Regression Model
6. Discussion and conclusions
In typical experiments of alternating oﬀer bargaining participants are confronted with
just one pie-development and (except for Güth, Ockenfels and Wendel, 1993) with ulti-
matum power only in the last period t = T . Compared to this, our participants faced
four very diﬀerent types of pie-dynamics as well as early (t ≤ T ) and only late (t = T )
ultimatum power. By exploring the broader spectrum of institutions/rules we could
demonstrate that participants
• are motivated by eﬃciency considerations, i.e. aim at reaching an agreement when
the pie is largest, and
• use unfair oﬀers mainly as a signal that an agreement should be reached when the
pie is largest,
• are reluctant to exploit ultimatum power regardless of when it is available.
10Cf. note 2.
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Compared to other studies of robust learning (see Güth, 2000) this leaves little or no
room for learning. This suggests the more general conclusion that experience or learning,
that is the shadow of the past, is less important when strong norms like eﬃciency and
equality concerns provide strong guidance on how to negotiate.
Forward-looking deliberation seems to be decisive. The main intentions, namely to
share the maximal pie and to propose a rather fair distribution, reveal carefully de-
liberated plans and thus a much stronger shadow of the future than of the past. The
results for the games Iy and Hy nevertheless reveal that normative game theory, which
is purely forward-looking, does not explain experimentally observed behavior (compare
the predictions in Table II.2 with the results in Table IV.4). The forward-looking consid-
erations of the participants are strategic rather than norm-oriented: Behavior is shaped
by fairness and eﬃciency concerns and not by opportunistic rationality.
It would, however, be premature to generalize our conclusions beyond the scope
of distribution conflicts in small groups like dyads. Other situations, for instance large
anonymous markets, might trigger more egoistic motives and lead to outcomes which are
more in line with opportunistic rationality. Although each robust learning experiment
like ours already covers a variety of structurally diﬀerent institutions, one should conduct
similar studies for other types of decision problems (see the studies reviewed in Güth,
2000).
When can we nevertheless expect external validity of our major findings? Although
we did not try to induce entitlement (see, e.g. Hoﬀman and Spitzer, 1995, or Güth and
Tietz, 1986), we expect strong fairness concerns when there exists strong entitlement of a
qualitative nature. Imagine, for instance, a joint venture of two partners who contribute
various skills and talents in addition to their time and capital. It seems rather likely
that such partners when trying to terminate their joint venture, for instance by selling
it, will sell when they achieve the highest price (their pie), and that this price will be
shared equally. Furthermore, the social norms of fairness and eﬃciency will be especially
dominant when future dealings among the partners cannot be excluded.
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Appendix A: Instructions:
In the experiment you will interact anonymously in groups of two participants. Each
participant gets DM 5.0 show up fee. You will not be informed about the other’s identity, nor
will your partner be informed about yours. You and your partner constitute a group of two
persons named A and B. What A and B can share is an amount of points, p (20 points = DM
1.0), whose value depends on when you and you partner reach an agreement. The interaction
is organized as follows:
1. In the first period, t = 1, Partner A chooses an oﬀer O1 to Partner B. If Partner B
accepts the oﬀer, A earns p1 −O1 and B earns O1. If not, they proceed to the second period
t = 2.
2. In the second period, t = 2, Partner B chooses an oﬀer O2 to Partner A. If Partner A
accepts the oﬀer, B earns p2 − O2 and A earns O2. If not, they proceed to the third period
t = 3.
3. In the third period, t = 3, Partner A chooses an oﬀer O3 to Partner B. If Partner B
accepts the oﬀer, A earns p3 −O3 and B earns O3. If not, both earn 0.
The values p1, p2 and p3 depend on the situation D, I, H or V :
p1 p2 p3 Situation
30 20 10 D
10 20 30 I
10 25 10 H
25 10 25 V
In addition, you may have a Termination Option.
Termination Option : If one partner chooses the termination option in period t < 3, the
interaction process ends with this oﬀer, i.e. the other cannot make a counter-oﬀer. Partner
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A can choose the Termination Option in t = 1, and partner B in t = 2. If A chooses the
termination option, partner B cannot choose it in the next period as the interaction stops in
period t = 1 regardless of whether B accepts or not.
You will be four times in situation D (twice without and twice with the Termination
Option), then four times in situation I (twice without and twice with the Termination Option),
then four times in situation H (twice without and twice with the Termination Option), four
times in situation V (twice without and twice with the Termination Option). The whole
session consists of three sequences of such 16 rounds, i.e. of altogether 48 rounds. At the
beginning of each round, we randomly form new groups of two participants with one A and
one B participant.
After each round you will be informed about your own earnings. Payments will be made
privately at the end of the session. Please raise your hand if you have any questions. We will
try to answer them privately. Thank you for your cooperation!
Appendix B: Questionnaire
Please fill out this questionnaire completely. To check your understanding of the instruc-
tions, we kindly ask you to answer the following questions. Consider the following arbitrarily
specified decisions:
1. A and B didn’t reach an agrement in period t = 1.
Who will propose a counter-oﬀer in period t = 2 ?
A or B
2. In period t = 2, the oﬀer equals O2 = 5 and A accepts it.
How much do A and B participants earn?
A earns
In situation D,
B earns
A earns
In situation I ,
B earns
A earns
In situation H ,
B earns
A earns
In situation V ,
B earns
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3. Imagine that partner A chooses the termination option in period t = 1.
Can Partner B make a counteroﬀer in period t = 2 ?
Yes
No
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